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CRIMINAL LAW-STATE OF CONNECTICUT V. JOYCE: WHO 
GETS BURNED BY THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF FIRE-DAMAGED 
CLOTHING? 
INTRODUCfION 
Under the community caretaking function, police frequently 
collect and store personal property that is exposed to possible loss, 
damage, or theft.! Upon discovering property in danger of such 
perils, police often confiscate and hold the property until it can be 
returned to its proper owner. Because this acquisition is in no way 
intended to collect evidence of crime, but simply to protect the pub­
lic's property, the police are not required to obtain a warrant before 
seizing the property.2 Once such property is seized under the com­
munity caretaking function, it is less clear what limits should be 
placed upon the police regarding the property, and whether a war­
rant is required to permit the search of such property.3 
State v. Joyce4 raised just such an issue. In Joyce, the Connecti­
cut State Police secured a fire victim's burnt clothing pursuant to 
their community caretaking function. Without procuring a warrant, 
the police then shipped the clothing to a state forensic laboratory 
for chemical analysis, which showed traces of gasoline on the vic­
tim's clothing. At trial, the defendant was convicted of arson in the 
first degree,S from which he appealed, claiming that the court erred 
in failing to exclude the evidence of gasoline traces, evidence which 
resulted from an illegal, warrantless search. The Connecticut Ap­
pellate Court affirmed the lower court's conviction and certiorari 
1. See, e.g., State v. "fully, 348 A.2d 603, 609 (Conn. 1974) (for purpose of safe­
keeping, police pennitted under community caretaking function to confiscate a guitar 
from an abandoned parked car). 
2. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973) (searches that are "totally di­
vorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the viola­
tion of a criminal statute" fall under the pOlice's community caretaking function, and 
are not subject to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement). 
3. See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative Regula­
tions: The Use, Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in Fourth Amendment 
Adjudication, 89 MICH. L. REv. 442, 460 n.107 (1990) (explaining that no warrant is 
required for inventory searches because such searches fall under the police's commu­
nity caretaking function). 
4. 639 A.2d 1007 (Conn. 1994). 
5. See infra note 93 and accompanying text. 
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was granted by the Connecticut Supreme Court. The court was re­
quired to determine whether the police, having lawfully obtained 
custodial possession of the defendant's burnt clothing, nevertheless 
were required under article first, section 7 of the Connecticut Con­
stitution6 to obtain a search warrant before performing a chemical 
analysis on the clothing.? The court held that a search warrant was 
indeed required.s 
The concern in Joyce focused upon whether the defendant pos­
sessed an interest in the burnt clothing protected by article first, 
section 7 of the Connecticut Constitution.9 Analyzing this issue, 
the Connecticut Supreme Court concentrated on whether the de­
fendant maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the burnt 
clothing.10 
The controversy presented in Joyce had never been addressed 
by the Connecticut Supreme Court nor by any other state or federal 
court. Thus, the Joyce opinions raise novel and interesting ques­
tions regarding a person's expectation of privacy. For example, 
does the damaged nature of the burnt clothing render it unpro­
tected? Specifically, is burnt clothing analogous to curbside gar­
bage, which can never be the object of a legitimate expectation of 
privacy no matter what steps the "owner" took to manifest such an 
expectation?l1 Is burnt clothing analogous to a burned-out build­
ing, which generally receives constitutional protection as long as an 
expectation of privacy is manifested in the burnt remains by the 
owner?12 Is burnt clothing analogous to illegal contraband, which 
can never itself be the object of a legitimate expectation of privacy 
6. CONN. CONST. art. first, § 7 provides: 

The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions 

from unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place, 

or to seize any person or things, shall issue without describing them as nearly 

as may be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation. 

Id. 
7. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1009. 
8. Id. at 1017. 
9. See supra note 6. 
10. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1013 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) 
(Harlan, J., concurring) (establishing a two part subjective/objective test to determine 
whether an individual exhibits a reasonable expectation of privacy). See infra part I.B 
for a discussion of the Katz test. 
11. See, e~g., State v. DeFusco, 620 A.2d 746, 753 (Conn. 1993) (narcotics defend­
ant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage he placed at curbside for 
pickup). 
12. See, e.g., State v. Zindros, 456 A.2d 288, 296-97 (Conn. 1983) (lessee of build­
ing sufficiently demonstrated that he still possessed legitimate expectation of privacy in 
building eleven days after it was destroyed by fire), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012 (1984). 
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because it is the instrument of a crime?13 Finally, assuming that 
. none of the above categorical characterizations disqualifies a de­
fendant's constitutional protection, does the defendant relinquish 
his expectation of privacy via abandonment when the burnt cloth­
ing is left behind at the accident scene and secured by the police 
under the community caretaking function?14 This Note will analyze 
and critique the Joyce decision in an attempt to provide an answer 
to these questions. 
Part I of this Note provides a brief overview of the Katz v. 
United States 15 test. It also explains how the Katz test has been 
applied in three related Connecticut Supreme Court cases.16 
Part II presents the facts of Joyce and examines the reasoning 
behind the decisions of the Connecticut Appellate Court17 and the 
Connecticut Supreme Court.18 Particular attention is paid to the 
divergence between the majority and dissenting opinions of the 
Connecticut Supreme Court decision regarding the defendant's ex­
pectation of privacy. 
Part III analyzes Joyce in terms of the four narrow questions 
presented above. Specifically, it evaluates whether the defendant's 
burnt clothing is most analogous to garbage, burned-out buildings, 
or illegal contraband, and whether the defendant, regardless of any 
categorical protection, nevertheless abandoned any expectation of 
13. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (test that indi­
cates the presence of cocaine does not violate legitimate expectation of privacy); United 
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (no expectation of privacy in marijuana de­
tected by dog sniff); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (noting that society 
is not prepared to recognize an expectation of privacy in incriminating evidence). 
14. See, e.g., Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960) (after defendant had 
checked out of hotel, papers discovered in wastebasket of his room were not protected 
by Fourth Amendment); State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 159 (Conn.) (stating that aban­
donment requires the relinquishment of an expectation of privacy), cert. denied, 502 
U.S. 919 (1991). See also Edward G. Mascolo, The Role ofAbandonment in the Law of 
Search and Seizure: An Application of Misdirected Emphasis, 20 BUFF. L. REv. 399, 
400 (1970) ("[W]here one abandons property, he is said to bring his right of privacy 
therein to an end ...."); David H. Steinberg, Note, Constructing Homes for the Home­
less? Searching for a Fourth Amendment Standard. 41 DUKE L.J. 1508, 1529 (1992) 
("One cannot manifest a reasonable expectation of privacy in an item once it has been 
abandoned."). 
15. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
16. State v. DeFusco, 620 A.2d 746, 750 (Conn. 1993) (Katz test applied to curb­
side garbage); Mooney, 588 A.2d at 152 (Katz test applied to abandoned property); 
State v. Zindros, 456 A.2d 288, 294 (Conn. 1983) (Katz test applied to burned-out build­
ing), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012 (1984). 
17. State v. Joyce, 619 A.2d 872 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993). 
18. State v. Joyce, 639 A.2d 1007 (Conn. 1994). 
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privacy he may have possessed in the clothing, leaving it devoid of 
any constitutional protection. 
Finally, this Note concludes that an expectation of privacy in 
burnt clothing is similar to that of a burned-out building in that the 
severity of the burnt condition plays a significant role in determin­
ing whether society will consider an expectation of privacy in the 
remains reasonable; that the defendant in Joyce indeed possessed a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the burnt clothing; and that a 
search warrant should have been procured before the chemical 
analysis was performed. In sum, because the defendant in Joyce 
possessed a protected interest in his burnt clothing, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court made the correct decision to exclude all evidence 
obtained through a warrantless search. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Balancing State and Federal Constitutional Protection 
It is well established that an individual state, when interpreting 
its own state constitution, can make use of federal precedents that 
are logically reasonable and persuasive.19 Consistent with this prac­
tice, the Connecticut Supreme Court has repeatedly chosen to look 
to federal precedent when deciding cases interpreting the liberties 
afforded to its citizens by the Connecticut Constitution.20 Thus, in 
evaluating the constitutional issue raised in State v. Joyce, the Con­
necticut Supreme Court elected to utilize the same analytical 
framework that would be used under the United States Constitu­
tion.21 The court, however, pointed out that the adoption of such a 
framework does "not compel [it] ... to reach the same outcome 
that a federal court might reach when the methodology is applied to 
a particular set of factual circumstances. "22 
19. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983); see also Justice William J. 
Brennan Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. 
REv. 489, 502 (1977): 
[S]tate court judges, and also practitioners, do well to scrutinize constitutional 
decisions by federal courts, for only if they are found to be logically persuasive 
and well-reasoned, paying due regard to precedent and the policies underlying 
specific constitutional guarantees, may they properly claim persuasive weight 
as guideposts when interpreting counterpart state guarantees. 
Id. 
20. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1013. 
21. Id. at 1012. 
22. Id. at 1012 n.12. While the United States Constitution sets a minimum na­
tionallevel of guaranteed individual rights, its assertions have never been interpreted as 
maximum levels that may not be exceeded by a particular state's constitution. Thus, 
309 1996] WHO GETS BURNED? 
B. A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
In its 1967 landmark decision, Katz v. United States,23 the 
United States Supreme Court determined that the government's 
electronic eavesdropping of a telephone call Katz made from a pub­
lic phone booth violated his Fourth Amendment rights.24 The 
Supreme Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment protects 
what a person intends to preserve as private25 and that the defend­
ant, Katz, had intended the phone call he made to be a private con­
versation heard only by himself and the person he had called.26 The 
Court further determined that Katz's privacy expectation was ob­
jectively reasonable, since most people making a call from inside a 
telephone booth with the doors pulled closed would expect their 
conversation to be private.27 Katz's reliance on this expectation of 
privacy was thereby justifiable and required the Constitution's pro­
tection accordingly.28 Thus, the Court created a subjective/objec­
tive judicial requisite for Fourth Amendment protection, requiring 
individuals may be afforded more protection in a particular circumstance under their 
state constitution where similar rights would not exist under the United States Constitu­
tion. See Cologne v. Westfarrns Assocs., 469 A.2d 1201, 1206 (Conn. 1984) (holding 
that a group of individuals was afforded access to private shopping center property to 
engage in free speech under the Connecticut Constitution even though no similar right 
is afforded by the United States Constitution). The Connecticut Supreme Court, there­
fore, is free to grant its citizens a higher level of protection by interpreting the provi­
sions of the Connecticut Constitution more broadly than the United States Supreme 
Court has under the United States Constitution. See also State v. Geisler, 610 A.2d 
1225, 1231 (Conn. 1992); Symposium: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 
TEX. L. REv. 959 (1985). 
For a historical analysis of the Connecticut Constitution, aimed at assisting attor­
neys in bringing state constitutional claims in Connecticut courts, see generally Justice 
Robert I. Berdon, An Analytical Framework for Raising State Constitutional Claims in 
Connecticut, 14 Q.L.R. 191 (1994). 
23. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz was charged with transmitting wagering informa­
tion by telephone in violation of federal statute. Without obtaining a warrant, the FBI 
obtained evidence of Katz's telephone conversations through the use of an electronic 
listening and recording device, which had been secretly attached to the outside of the 
public telephone booth from which Katz placed the calls. Id. at 348. 
24. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef­
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma­
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
U.S. CoNST. amend. IV. 
25. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52. 
26. Id. at 352. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 353. 
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"[flirst that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expecta­
tion of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society 
is prepared to recognize as reasonable."29 Unless both prongs of 
this test are satisfied, the individual possesses no legitimate expecta­
tion of privacy over the property in question, and no rights are vio­
lated by a warrantless search or seizure of such property.30 
In 1993, the Connecticut Supreme Court, in State v. DeFusco,31 
adopted the Katz test to interpret and apply article first, section 7 
of the Connecticut Constitution.32 The Connecticut Supreme 
Court formulated a factor analysis to determine whether the de­
fendant possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage 
he had placed by the curbside for collection. The court assessed: 
(1) whether the defendant manifested a subjective expectation of 
privacy with respect to the property; and (2) whether that expecta­
tion is one that society would consider reasonable.33 By framing its 
analysis in this way, the court established a new methodology for 
applying article first, section 7 of the Connecticut Constitution.34 
C. Applying the Katz Test 
After deciding Katz, the United States Supreme Court faced 
the challenge of applying the new rule to a myriad of factual pos­
sibilities.35 As more and more situations were evaluated under 
Katz, distinct categories of what would and would not receive pro­
tection under the Fourth Amendment began to emerge. For exam­
ple, the United States Supreme Court held that individuals' 
expectations of privacy in garbage36 and open fields37 fail the Katz 
29. [d. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
30. Id. 
31. 620 A.2d 746, 750 (Conn. 1993). 
32. See supra note 6 for language of CONN. CoNST., art. first, § 7. 
33. Defusco, 620 A.2d at 750. 
34. Id. (U Although we have never addressed the proper standard for detennining 
the applicability of article first, § 7, neither party contests the appropriateness of using 
the Katz test in this case."); see also Mitchell S. Brody, Developments in Connecticut 
Criminal Law: 1992-1993, 68 CoNN. B.J. 37,37-38 (1994) (commenting on the DeFusco 
court's interpretation of article first, § 7). 
35. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.1 (2d ed. 1987); Melvin Guttennan, A Formulation ofthe 
Value and Means Models of the Fourth Amendment in the Age of Technologically En­
hanced Surveillance, 39 SYRACUSE L. REv. 647 (1988). 
36. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (holding that no rea­
sonable expectation of privacy exists in one's trash placed at the curbside); Jon E. 
Lemole, Note, From Katz to Greenwood: Abandonment Gets Recycled from the Trash 
Pile-Can Our Garbage Be Saved from the Court's Rummaging Hands?, 41 CASE W. 
REs. L. REv. 581 (1991). 
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test and are categorically beyond the scope of the Fourth Amend­
ment's protection. Similarly, the Court refused to grant protection 
to certain instruments of crime or contraband, such as guns38 or 
cocaine,39 reasoning that they failed to meet the Katz requirements. 
These types of property interests will not be protected under the 
Fourth Amendment regardless of the steps the individual takes to 
demonstrate that he or she possessed an expectation of privacy. By 
contrast, the Court determined that some property, such as fire­
damaged buildings,40 would receive constitutional protection only if 
the homeowner actively manifested some measure of seeking pri­
vacy. These types of property interests differ from the categorically 
excluded ones in that they are denied Fourth Amendment protec­
tion because the privacy expectation has not been subjectively man­
ifested by the particular defendant. 
The Connecticut Supreme Court has similarly created categori­
cal applications of the Katz test through its own case law. Three 
Connecticut cases are particularly relevant to the controversy raised 
in Joyce, each meriting its own analysis. 
1. State v. Zindros41 
On February 12, 1977, a fire caused extensive damage to a 
building leased by the defendant, Georgios Zindros.42 The defend­
ant operated a pizza parlor from within the building, but the fire 
rendered it unfit to conduct business. Eleven days after the fire, a 
warrantless search of the burned-out premises produced incriminat­
ing evidence of arson against the defendant.43 
The Connecticut Supreme Court determined that the defend­
ant still possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in the build­
37. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (holding that society has 
no interest in protecting the privacy of property located in an open field setting); James 
Leonard, Note, Criminal Procedure-Oliver v. United States: The Open Fields Doctrine 
Survives Katz, 63 N.C. L. REv. 546 (1985). 
38. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (holding that society is not prepared 
to recognize as reasonable an expectation of privacy in incriminating evidence), reh'g 
denied, 439 U.S. 1122 (1979). 
39. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (holding that a field 
test which checks specifically for the presence of illegal drugs, but reveals no private 
facts about the individual, does not violate any legitimate expectation of privacy). 
40. See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984) (holding that a search directed 
at determining the cause of a fire of a building requires a search warrant if the owner's 
expectation of privacy in the building remains after the fire). 
41. 456 A.2d 288 (Conn. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012 (1984). 
42. Id. at 291. 
43. Id. at 291-93. 
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ing at the time of the search.44 The court reasoned that the 
defendant had not abandoned the propertY's and that the building's 
burned-out and boarded-up condition did not divest him of a rea­
sonable privacy expectation.46 The court further explained that, 
during the eleven day period following the fire, the defendant had 
manifested an ongoing privacy expectation by securing the premises 
each time he visited it.47 Additionally, the court considered the 
value of the personal property left on the premises48 and the de­
fendant's intention to repair the premises and reopen the 
business.49 
2. State v. MooneySO 
The defendant, David Mooney, was a homeless person ar­
rested for murder on August 5, 1987.51 Later that night, the police 
searched several of the defendant's possessions, including a duffel 
bag and a closed cardboard box, which they found unattended 
under a highway bridge abutment that the defendant had been us­
ing as a home. 52 
The Connecticut Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
whether a homeless person could possess a reasonable expectation' 
of privacy in property left unattended.53 The court concluded that 
the expectation of privacy in a closed duffel bag and box required 
the same special protection provided to "closed containers."54 The 
court was unpersuaded that the defendant had forfeited such rights 
by abandoning the property under the bridge, since the facts sug­
gested that the police were well aware that the defendant regarded 
44. Id. 
45. Id. The court defined abandonment as "a question of fact ... [that1implies a 
voluntary and intentional renunciation, but the intent may be inferred as a fact from the 
surrounding circumstances." Id. at 296 (quoting Pizzuto v. Newington, 386 A.2d 238, 
240 (Conn. 1978». 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. (approximately $6750 worth of equipment remained functional inside the 
damaged building). 
49. Id. 
50. 588 A.2d 145 (Conn.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 (1991). 
51. Id. at 150. 
52. Id. at 150-51. 
53. ld. at 154. 
54. Id. The court explained that "society has traditionally afforded a high degree 
of deference to expectations of privacy in closed containers because such an area is 
normally intended as a repository of personal effects." Id. at 160. See United States v. 
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1. 11 (1977) (holding that a reasonable expectation of privacy ex­
isted in a closed footlocker loaded onto a vehicle). 
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the site under the bridge as his home.55 
3. State v. DeFusco56 
On October 12, 1990, police officers found illegal narcotics in­
side the home of Paul DeFusco.57 The search was performed pur­
suant to a warrant issued upon an affidavit describing suspicious 
items that police officers had obtained from garbage placed at the 
curbside outside the defendant's home.58 
The Connecticut Supreme Court found that the defendant did 
not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage placed 
by the curbside for collection. 59 The court reasoned that when the 
defendant placed the garbage at the curb, he left the garbage widely 
susceptible to invasion from a variety of intruders, such as munici­
pal workers, antique collectors, bottle or coupon redeemers, 
snoops, vagrants, and animals, and therefore maintained no reason­
able expectation of privacy in the garbage.60 Thus, the defendant 
could not legitimately expect his curbside garbage to remain free 
from examination, and the police were not required to obtain a 
warrant before searching through it or seizing it.61 
D. Burden of Proving an Unconstitutional Search 
Under both the United States and Connecticut constitutions,62 
in order to be entitled to the constitutional protection against un­
reasonable searches, a defendant must prove that he or she pos­
sessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in the item searched, and 
that this expectation was one that society would recognize as rea­
sonable.63 It is the defendant's burden to demonstrate that both 
prongs of the test were satisfied, and that a warrant, therefore, 
should have been procured.64 Whether the defendant has estab­
55. Mooney, 588 A.2d at 159-60. 
56. 620 A.2d 746 (Conn. 1993). 
57. Id. at 748. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 753. 
60. Id. at 752 (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (prior to 
DeFusco, the United States Supreme Court reached a nearly identical holding when 
presented with a set of facts)}. 
61. Id. at 753. See also Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 41. 
62. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
63. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-05 (1980); Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); State v. Pittman, 553 A.2d 155, 
157 (Conn. 1989). 
64. State v. Brown, 503 A.2d 566, 569-70 (Conn. 1986). The United States 
Supreme Court, however, has created some well-delineated exceptions to the warrant 
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lished a reasonable expectation of privacy must be determined on a 
case by case basis,65 which mandates a factual inquiry into all the 
relevant circumstances.66 
II. STATE v. JOyce67 
A. Statement of Facts68 
At approximately 4:00 p.m. on January 29, 1990, fire-fighters 
and paramedics responded to a report of a fire at 125 Maple Street, 
East Haven, Connecticut.69 Emergency medical technician Charles 
Licata arrived at the location to find the residence in flames and the 
defendant, Wallace Joyce, standing waist deep in a nearby river, ap­
parently severely bumed.7° Licata assisted Joyce out of the river 
and onto its embankment. Joyce was seriously injured, with first, 
second, and third degree bums covering 42 percent of his body.71 
To best treat Joyce's wounds and prevent infection, Licata de­
cided to cut off the smoldering clothing that remained on Joyce's 
body.72 Licata laid the charred remains of clothing on the ground 
and immediately proceeded to clean and dress Joyce's wounds and 
provide appropriate emergency first-aid. Joyce was then trans­
ported by ambulance to Yale-New Haven Hospital.73 
Following the ambulance's departure from the scene of the 
requirement. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent excep­
tion); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident to arrest exception); 
Dyke v. Taylor Implementing Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968) (plain view search excep­
tion); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (exigent circumstances exception); Car­
roll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (automobile search exception). For a more 
detailed summary on the warrant requirement and its exceptions, see Darrel C. Waugh, 
Note, Developing Guidelines in Fourth Amendment "Clothing Cases" After United 
States v. Butler, 16 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 289,291-95 (1994). 
65. State v. Reddick, 541 A.2d 1209, 1213 (Conn. 1988). 
66. State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 152, (Conn.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 (1991). 
67. 639 A.2d 1007 (Conn. 1994). 
68. The statement of facts presented in this section was compiled by interweaving 
the records presented respectively in the Connecticut Supreme Court opinion, State v. 
Joyce, 639 A.2d 1007 (Conn. 1994), and the Connecticut Appellate Court opinion, State 
v. Joyce, 619 A.2d 872 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993). While the factual records in these two 
opinions are consistent with one another, each provides significantly more detail than 
the other in particular sections. In an attempt to minimize confusion to the reader, 
footnotes have been provided to mark switches from one source to the other. 
69. Joyce, 619 A.2d at 874. The property formerly had been owned by the de­
fendant's father, who approximately nine months previously had passed away leaving a 
life tenancy in the house to the defendant's sister and her son. Id. at 874 n.2. 
70. Id. at 874. 
71. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1009. 
72. Joyce, 619 A.2d at 875 n.5. 
73. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1009-10. 
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fire, East Haven Police Detective Bruce Scobie, acting under the 
police's community caretaking function,74 secured Joyce's clothing, 
placed it in the trunk of his cruiser, and brought it to the police 
department.75 Scobie later testified that he took possession of the 
clothing so that it "wouldn't be stolen or 10st."76 
Licata and East Haven Police Detective Paul Hemingway ac­
companied Joyce to the hospital in the ambulance.77 Along the 
way, Licata briefly questioned Joyce regarding the fire,78 Joyce in­
dicated that he h~d gone to the house "to check on something," 
that he had "opened the door," and that "there had been an explo­
sion."79 He could not recall whether he had been blown from the 
house or whether he ran into the river.80 
After they arrived at the emergency room of the hospital, 
Hemingway questioned Joyce.8! Joyce repeated the information he 
had told Licata while in the ambulance earlier.82 Hemingway con­
tinued to interrogate Joyce, but Joyce's medical condition left him 
unable to respond.83 Hemingway informed Joyce's wife, who had 
been called to the hospital and was present for the questioning, that 
the police "had [Joyce's] burnt clothing and wallet," which she 
could pick up at the East Haven Police Department.84 
Later that night, at the police department, detectives Scobie 
74. In 1973, the United States Supreme Court determined that the police have a 
duty to protect property exposed to possible loss, damage, or theft. See Cady v. Dom­
browski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973). The Court characterized this duty as the police's 
"community caretaking function." Id. In such instances, it becomes unnecessary for 
the police to obtain a warrant before confiscating such property and holding it in custo­
dial possession until it can be returned to the original owner. 
The Connecticut Supreme Court adopted the policy of "community caretaking" in 
1974. See State v. Thlly, 348 A.2d 603, 608 (Conn. 1974). Connecticut's policy was 
borrowed directly from Cady: "'Local police officers ... frequently ... engage in what, 
for want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking functions, totally 
divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the 
violation of a criminal statute.'" Id. at 609 (alteration in original) (quoting Cady, 413 
U.S. at 441). 
75. Joyce, 619 A.2d at 875. 
76. Id. 










84. Id. Although Joyce's wife picked up the wallet the next day, no attempt was 
ever made by either Joyce or his wife to retrieve the clothing until just prior to Joyce's 
trial when the motion to suppress evidence was made. Id. at 1009. 
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and Hemingway inventoried Joyce's clothing and wallet.85 The of­
ficers then dried, tagged, bagged, and stored Joyce's property in a 
closet at the police station.86 The trial court found that in taking 
custody of Joyce's clothing, the police had acted appropriately pur­
suant to their community caretaking function.87 
The following day, January 30, 1990, as a result of ongoing in­
vestigation, Joyce became an arson suspect.88 Detective Scobie 
then gave Joyce's unclaimed clothing to Fire Marshall Frederick 
Brow, who immediately transported it to the state forensic labora­
tory in Meriden for chemical testing.89 Brow did not obtain a 
search warrant before ordering the chemical analysis of the 
clothing.90 
At the forensic laboratory, gas chromatography analysis re­
vealed traces of gasoline on Joyce's clothing.91 Carpet and wood 
samples taken from the house by police also tested positive for the 
presence of gasoline.92 The clothing was later returned to the East 
Haven police department. 
Mter extended hospitalization, Joyce was charged with two 
counts of arson in the first degree under Connecticut General Stat­
utes sections 53a-111(a)(3) and 53a-111(a)(4).93 Prior to trial, Joyce 
85. Id. at 1010. 
86. Both Scobie and Hemingway claimed that, at this point, Joyce was not sus­
pected of starting the fire. Scobie explained that his intention in securing the clothing 
was to return it to its owner, and that he had been following "customary procedure for 
safekeeping property." Id. 
f57. Id. (citing State v. Thlly, 348 A.2d 603, 608-09 (Conn. 1974». The Joyce court 
pointed out that neither party challenged this finding on appeal. Id. 
88. Id. The record is unclear as to what change in circumstance led to Joyce's 
becoming a suspect between January 29 and January 30,1990. 
89. Id. Brow actually delivered Joyce's clothing to the laboratory in two separate 
trips. For reasons that do not appear in the record, Joyce's undershirt and dungarees 
were left out of the first conveyance of clothing and were transported separately, by 
Brow, two days later. Id. 
90. Id. A search warrant was obtained several days later to seize Joyce's pickup 
truck, which had been parked a short distance from the scene of the fire. Id. 
91. Id. At trial, the head of the chemistry department at the state forensic labora­
tory, Jack Hubball, presented the exact scientific method used on Joyce's clothing. 
Hubball explained that the distillation procedure used in the analysis involved heating 
Joyce's clothing to vaporize all organic materials and separating the vapor into individ­
ual chemical compounds by their distinct boiling points. Computer printouts of the 
identified compounds were then compared with the signature patterns of known or­
ganic substances. The signature pattern of gasoline was identified as present in Joyce's 
shirt, shoes, socks, and jeans. Id. 
92. Id. at 1010 n.3. 
93. Id. at 1009. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-ll1 (1995) provides in pertinent part: 
(a) A person is guilty of arson in the first degree when, with intent to destroy 
or damage a building, as defined in section 53a-roO, he starts a fire or causes 
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moved to suppress the results of the chemical analysis of his cloth­
ing, but the court rejected the motion.94 A jury convicted Joyce of 
arson in the first degree in violation of section 53a-ll1(a)(4) and 
acquitted him of the charge under section 53a-111(a)(3).95 Joyce 
was sentenced to a twelve year jail term, suspended after four years, 
fined $5,000, and placed on five years probation.96 On appeal, the 
Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed the conviction, with one 
judge dissenting.97 
B. The Connecticut Appellate Court's Decision 
1. The Majority Opinion 
Writing for the majority, Judge O'Connell first recognized that 
the Fourth Amendment protects an individual's expectations of 
both "freedom from unreasonable searches and freedom from un­
reasonable seizures."98 .Thus, the court divided Joyce's claim into 
the following sub-issues: (1) whether Joyce's clothing was illegally 
seized; and (2) whether transporting the clothing to the state foren­
sic laboratory or conducting a chemical analysis of it once present 
at the laboratory constituted an illegal search.99 
In analyzing whether the clothing was illegally seized, the court 
first established that the police originally obtained the clothing in a 
legal manner, pursuant to their community caretaking function. lOo 
Having found that the police had legal custodial possession of the 
clothing, the majority next reasoned that no warrant was needed 
before transferring it to the forensic laboratory, because such a re-
an explosion, and ... (3) such fire or explosion was caused for the purpose of 
collecting insurance proceeds for the resultant loss; or (4) at the scene of such 
fire or explosion a peace officer or firefighter is subjected to a substantial risk 
of bodily injury. 
Id. 
94. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1009. 
95. Id. See supra note 93 for the language of the statute. 
96. Id. 
97. State v. Joyce, 619 A.2d 872 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993) (Heiman, J., dissenting). 
98. Id. at 876 (citing Horton v. California, 496 u.S. 128, 133 (1990); United States 
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984». Because the defendant did not make any argu­
ments specifically under the Connecticut Constitution, the appellate court chose to ana­
lyze his complaint exclusively under the United States Constitution. Id. at 876 n.7. 
99. Joyce, 619 A.2d at 876. The court relied on the United States Supreme 
Court's definitions of search and seizure. "A 'search' occurs when an expectation of 
privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed. A 'seizure' of prop­
erty occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory 
interests in that property." Id. (quoting Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113). 
100. Id. at 876 (citing State v. Thlly, 348 A.2d 603, 608-09 (Conn. 1974»; see supra 
note 74 for an explanation of the community caretaking function. 
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quirement would place an "unwieldy burden" on the police that 
could not be justifiably balanced by any "concomitant benefit to the 
owner of the property."101 Thus, the court concluded that no illegal 
seizure had taken place.102 The court reasoned that transferring the 
clothing to the laboratory created no additional interference with 
Joyce's possessory interest in the clothing.103 More specifically, 
since Joyce was never denied access to the clothing, the court deter­
mined that the police did not restrict his right to exercise dominion 
and control over the clothing.104 
To begin the next step of determining whether the chemical 
analysis of Joyce's clothing constituted an illegal search, the major­
ity asserted that it is not enough that the defendant possess an ex­
pectation of privacy, but that he must actually exhibit this 
expectation.105 Thus, the majority opined that although Joyce may 
have maintained ownership of his clothing while the police held it 
in custody, he failed to exhibit the necessary expectation of privacy 
after the police took possession of it. The court reasoned that 
"[m]ere ownership ... does not demonstrate a reasonable expecta­
tion of privacy," and that a person may "retain a property interest 
in an item, but nonetheless . . . relinquish his or her reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the object."106 
The court recognized that a reasonable expectation of privacy 
is usually presumed in the clothing people wear, but the court de­
termined that this presumption does not apply to clothing that is so 
badly damaged by 'fire that it is "no longer usable as clothing. "107 
The court also asserted that an erosion of privacy necessarily re­
sulted from the fact that the clothing had been removed from 
Joyce's body without his resistance and left in a public place until 
secured by the police. lOS Based on these arguments, the court con­
cluded that Joyce "had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
101. Joyce, 619 A,2d at 876. The court asserted that to hold otherwise would 
result in a policy where, regarding property in the lawful possession of the police, "a 
seizure would arise each time something happens to that property thereby requiring a 




105. Id. at 877 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967» (defendant 
exhibited a privacy expectation by closing the doors to the phone booth); see supra note 
29 and accompanying text. 
106. Joyce, 619 A,2d at 877 (quoting State v. Mooney, 588 A,2d 145, 158 (Conn.), 
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 (1991». 
107. Id. at 877-78. 
108. Id. at 878 (citing Wagner V. Hedrick, 383 S.E.2d 286 (W. Va. 1989». 
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clothing."109 
The court concluded that even if there had been a seizure and 
Joyce had exhibited an expectation of privacy, the chemical analysis 
of the clothing would not have constituted a search.110 Relying on 
United States v. Jacobsen,111 the court concluded that such a "mini­
mally intrusive examination of the remnants of [Joyce's] clothing to 
determine whether it contained an accelerant was not a search 
within the meaning of the [F]ourth [A]mendment ."112 
2. The Dissenting Opinion 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Heiman disagreed with the ma­
jority's determination that transferring the clothing to the forensic 
laboratory to administer a chemical analysis did not constitute a 
seizure for which a warrant should have been required.113 
Although he agreed that the community caretaking function al­
lowed the police to secure Joyce's clothing initially,1l4 Judge Hei­
man asserted that transferring the clothing to the laboratory 
effectively ended the police's community caretaking services and 
constituted an unlawful seizure.llS He stated that the community 
caretaking function "cannot be used as a ruse or as a substitute for 
obtaining a warrant in order to seize an item for investigatory 
purposes."116 
Such a seizure, which the dissent argued created an interfer­
ence with Joyce's possessory interests, required a warrant. Thus, 
the dissent concluded that the absence of such a warrant created a 
warrantless seizure for investigatory purposes, and that Joyce's 
109. [d. The court noted that its analysis was not intended to suggest that the 
expectation was one which society would recognize as reasonable. That issue was not 
brought up in Joyce's appellate brief and was not addressed by the appellate court. [d. 
at 878 n.14. 
110. [d. at 878-79. 
111. 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (stating that a search under the Fourth Amendment 
requires revealment of some private facts about an individual); see infra note 136 and 
accompanying text. 
112. Joyce, 619 A.2d at 878. Addressing additional issues argued on appeal, the 
appellate court majority opinion further held that: (1) the trial court was correct in 
refusing to admit evidence of arson against Joyce's nephew on grounds of relevancy, id. 
at 880-81; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction against Joyce, id. 
at 882-83. These two issues were not addressed by the Supreme Court of Connecticut 
and are outside the scope of this Note. 
113. [d. at 883 (Heiman, J., dissenting). 
114. [d. See supra note 74 for explanation of the police's community caretaking 
function. 
115. Joyce, 619 A.2d at 883. 
116. [d. 
320 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:305 
Fourth Amendment rights had been violated.!17 
C. The Connecticut Supreme Court's Decision118 
The Connecticut Supreme Court granted Joyce's petition for 
certiorari limited to the following issue: "In the circumstances of 
this case, were the police, while lawfully in custodial possession of 
the defendant's clothing, required by either the federal or state con­
stitution to obtain a warrant before transferring the clothing to a 
state laboratory and subjecting it to chemical analysis?"119 
1. The Majority Opinion 
In order to decide whether the results of the chemical analysis 
of Joyce's clothing should have been suppressed under Connecti­
cut's exclusionary rule,120 the court was required to decide: "(1) 
117. Id. at 884-85. The dissent also criticized the majority's argument that Joyce 
failed to exhibit an expectation of privacy over the clothing, considering the particular 
factual circumstances of the case. Judge Heiman characterized it as "somewhat disin­
genuous and Orwellian" to reason that an accident victim relinquishes his expectation 
of privacy over clothing that is removed from his person by police and medical person­
nel, or that the same victim should be required to reassert his expectation of privacy 
while laying in a hospital bed recovering from a life-threatening accident. Id. at 883 n.3. 
118. State v. Joyce, 639 A.2d 1007 (Conn. 1994). 
119. Id. at 1009 n.2. The court suggested that numerous federal opinions have 
held that the United States Constitution's Fourth Amendment prohibits police from 
freely searching undamaged property in their community caretaking custody. See, e.g., 
Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 654 (1980) (citing Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 
(1877)). However, the Joyce court noted that neither the United States Supreme Court, 
nor any federal circuit, had ever addressed the type of facts presented in Joyce, where in 
addition to being held under the community caretaking function, the property in ques­
tion was damaged as well. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1011 n.6. Nevertheless, because Joyce 
claimed a violation of the Connecticut Constitution as well as the United States Consti­
tution, the court stated that its decision only reached the state claim, but not the federal 
claim. Id. 
As was noted by the Connecticut Court of Appeals, Joyce failed to analyze and 
outline his state constitutional claim in his appellate brief. Under such circumstances, 
the Joyce court reaffirmed that it is not bound to review the state claim. Id. at 1011-12 
(citing State v. Birch, 594 A.2d 972 (Conn. 1991)). The Supreme Court of Connecticut, 
however, has never precluded itself from reviewing a state constitutional claim omitted 
in an appellate brief and reasoned that it may do so under the appropriate circum­
stances. Thus, the Joyce court concluded that, under the circumstances of this case, it 
was appropriate to review the defendant's state constitutional claim. Id. at 1012. 
120. Connecticut's exclusionary rule is a judicially created policy which prevents 
the use of evidence that the police obtained in violation of article first, § 7 of the Con­
necticut Constitution. State v. Dukes, 547 A.2d 10, 17-21 (Conn. 1988) (recognizing 
such a policy is an effective remedy for enforcement of the constitutional protection 
against unconstitutional searches and seizures."). See also Bruce R. Lockwood, Note, 
Connecticut Search & Seizure Law: The Connecticut Supreme Court Should Adopt a 
Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule to Article First, Section 7, o/the Connect­
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whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in the cloth­
ing; (2) whether the testing of the clothing at the state laboratory 
constituted a search; and (3) if so, whether the circumstances of this 
case fall within a recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement. "121 
Writing for the majority, Justice Berdon explained that in or­
der to determine whether Joyce had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the clothing, a two-part subjective/objective test must be 
satisfied, evaluating both whether Joyce manifested a subjective ex­
pectation of privacy regarding the clothing and whether society 
would consider that expectation reasonable,122 
Justice Berdon's opinion first stated that Connecticut case law 
has consistently held that a person generally possesses a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in clothing that he or she wears.123 The State 
advanced several arguments, each asserting that the facts of this 
case created an exception to this general rule and that Joyce's rea­
sonable expectation of privacy had been extinguished, but the Joyce 
majority was unpersuaded by these arguments,124 
The majority also rejected the State's argument that if the de­
fendant possessed an expectation of privacy, such an expectation 
was forfeited because he failed to exhibit any manifestation of it.125 
The majority reasoned that to require Joyce to have exhibited his 
expectation of privacy while he "lay in the hospital near death" 
icut Constitution, 13 BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 387, 388 (1993) (contrasting the Connecticut 
exclusionary rule with the federal exclusionary rule). 
121. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1012-13. For the purposes of its analysis, the court as­
sumed that the police possessed sufficient probable cause at the time of the chemical 
analysis that Joyce had started the fire. [d. at 1013. 
122. [d. at 1013 (citing State v. DeFusco, 620 A.2d 746, 750 (Conn. 1993) (apply­
ing two part subjective/objective standard for determining whether defendant possessed 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in his garbage placed at the curbside)). 
123. [d. (citing State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 155 (Conn.) (police were entitled 
to seize a homeless person's unattended possessions upon probable cause and preserve 
them while securing a proper search warrant, but the warrantless search of these posses­
sions was a violation of Fourth Amendment rights), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 (1991)). 
124. [d. For example, the State argued that Joyce's conduct of saturating his 
clothes with gasoline removed any expectation of privacy he may have possessed in 
them because such conduct exhibited no intent to keep such incriminating evidence 
private. The majority dismissed this argument, and stated that article first, § 7 protects 
all citizens, regardless of whether they are intentionally concealing crimes. [d. at 1013­
14. 
The State also argued that any odor of gasoline emanating from Joyce's clothing 
would eradicate his expectation of privacy, but the majority dismissed this argument 
since no witnesses had testified that they had smelled gasoline in the clothing. [d. at 
1014 n.14. 
125. [d. at 1014. 
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would be unreasonable and that Joyce's inactivity in no way mani­
fested any intention to surrender his expectation of privacy,126 The 
majority concluded that Joyce had "merely left his property behind 
him, more or less of necessity, making no attempt to discard it or 
disassociate it from himself."127 
Justice Berdon additionally refuted an argument, raised later 
by Justice Callahan in dissent, that defendant's reasonable expecta­
tion of privacy in the clothing was necessarily diminished because it 
was so badly burned and damaged.l28 Justice Berdon reasoned that 
the physical condition of personal property is immaterial to the 
ownership of the property and thus irrelevant to whether a suspect 
possesses an expectation of privacy over such property.129 The ma­
jority found that "[a]lthough the items of clothing tested at the state 
laboratory were unusable as clothing and reduced to rags, they 
were still [Joyce's] rags."130 The court relied upon State v. Zin­
dros,131 which held that the burnt condition of a building following 
a fire did not diminish an arson suspect's reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the building.132 Thus, by analogy, the majority concluded 
that Joyce did possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
burnt clothing, thereby entitling him to the protection of the war­
rant requirement.133 
Justice Berdon next asserted that the chemical analysis of the 
clothing performed at the state laboratory constituted a search.l34 
He explained that the elaborate process involved in gas chromatog­
raphy, as evidenced by the detailed testimony of the head of the 
chemical department at the forensic laboratory, uncovered "private 
facts" about Joyce,135 Justice Berdon distinguished such a personal 
126. Id. at 1014 n.13 (citing Mooney, 588 A.2d at 159-60 ("[N]o element of con­
duct manifesting a temporary intent to relinquish an expectation of privacy ... [and] of 
course, no contrary intent can be inferred from the fact that the police arrested 
[Mooney] and thus prevented him from returning ... that night."». 
127. Id. at 1014 (quoting State v. Philbrick, 436 A.2d 844, 855 (Me. 1981) (holding 
that the defendant, who was injured, did not abandon his expectation of privacy in his 
knapsack when he unintentionally left it behind at the accident scene». 
128. Id. See infra notes 146-149 and accompanying text. 
129. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1014. 
130. Id. The court further illustrated this point by noting that Joyce's wristwatch 
was later found undamaged inside the pocket of his burned shirt. Id. at 1014 n.15. 
131. 456 A.2d 288 (Conn. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012 (1984). 
132. Id. at 295-96. See infra note 152 for further discussion of Zindros. 
133. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1015. 
134. Id. 
135. To illustrate the "personal nature" of such private facts, the head of the 
chemistry department of the state forensic laboratory included documentation that the 
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type of analysis from the field test for cocaine in United States v. 
Jacobsen,136 which revealed no private facts about the defendant. 
In addition, Justice Berdon found that, unlike the field test in Ja­
cobsen, which indicated the presence of only one substance (co­
caine), the chemical analysis performed in Joyce was capable of 
detecting "the presence and identity of many organic sub­
stances."137 Thus, the majority concluded that the chemical analysis 
of the clothing did constitute a search under article first, section 7 of 
the Connecticut Constitution.138 
Finally, Justice Berdon asserted that the search performed on 
Joyce's clothing could not have been performed legally without a 
warrant.139 The majority relied on the established notion that the 
state constitutional preference requires the police to procure a war­
rant prior to performing a search.140 Furthermore, warrantless 
searches are per se unreasonable unless they fall within one of a few 
specifically established exceptions.141 Such exceptions are primarily 
limited to the acknowledged interests in protecting the safety of the 
police, the safety of the public, or in preventing the destruction of 
evidence.142 The majority determined that no exception permitted 
the warrantless search of Joyce's clothing.143 
In sum, finding that (1) Joyce possessed a reasonable expecta­
gas chromatography detected the presence of "an organic material in the defendant's 
underwear that was not an accelerant." [d. at 1015 n.16. 
136. 466 u.s. 109, 123 (1984) (holding that a field test which specifically checks 
for the presence of cocaine, but reveals no private facts about the individual, violates no 
legitimate expectation of privacy and, therefore, does not constitute a "search" under 
the Fourth Amendment). 
137. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1015 n.17. 
138. [d. at 1015. 
139. [d. 
140. [d. Such a preference is designed to reflect the goal of "protecting citizens 
from unjustified police intrusions by interposing a neutral decisionmaker between the 
police and the object of the proposed search." [d. (citing State v. Diaz, 628 A.2d 567 
(Conn. 1993». 
141. [d. at 1016. See also State v. Blades, 626 A.2d 273, 278 (Conn. 1993). See 
generally Robert M. Bloom, Warrant Requirement - The Burger Court Approach, 53 U. 
CoLO. L. REv. 691 (1982) (stating that the language of the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution creates a strong presumption of requiring a warrant). 
142. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1016 (citing State v. Miller, 630 A.2d 1315 (Conn. 1993». 
See generally H. Patrick Furman, The Exigent Circumstances Exception to the Warrant 
Requirement, 20 CoLO. LAW. 1167, 1168 (1991). 
143. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1016. In a motion to suppress evidence acquired through 
a warrantless search, the state bears the burden of proving that the particular facts fit 
into an exception to the warrant requirement. [d. at 1016 n.19 (citing State v. Cope­
land, 530 A.2d 603 (Conn. 1987». In Joyce, the State argued that the "evaporative 
properties of gasoline" created an exigent circumstance for a warrantless search. [d. at 
1016 n.19. However, because this argument was not presented to the trial court, the 
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tion of privacy in his clothing, (2) the chemical analysis of the cloth­
ing constituted an unreasonable search, and (3) the circumstances 
of the case did not fall under a recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement, the majority concluded that "the chemical analysis of 
[Joyce's] clothing should have been suppressed as the result of a 
warrantless search unsupported by exigent circumstance or any 
other recognized exception to the warrant requirement."l44 Ac­
cordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court 
and remanded the case for a new trial.145 
2. The Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Callahan dissented from the majority opinion because 
he determined that Joyce did not possess a "reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the burnt remnants of his clothing."146 The dissent 
opined that "any expectation of privacy that [Joyce] may have had 
in his clothing was diminished by virtue of their condition and their 
treatment."147 Justice Callahan reasoned that an expectation of pri­
vacy in clothing necessarily diminishes when it has been severely 
burned and left along a public road.148 Furthermore, even if Joyce 
had manifested that he himself possessed an expectation of privacy 
in his burnt clothing, such an expectation would not be recognized 
by society as reasonable.149 
The dissent criticized the majority's use of State v. Zindros .150 
Justice Callahan agreed with the holding in Zindros, concluding 
that a person's expectation of privacy in property does not disap­
pear merely because the property becomes damaged.151 However, 
he distinguished the facts of Joyce from those of Zindros. The Zin­
dros court based its conclusion on the facts that Zindros secared 
and locked the building each time he left it and continued to store 
valuable merchan~ise in the building despite its burnt condition.152 
majority declined to consider it. Id. at 1016 (citing State v. Reagan, 546 A.2d 839 
(Conn. 1988), cert. denied, 559 A.2d 1139 (1989)). 
144. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1017. 
145. Id. 




150. 456 A.2d 288 (Conn. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012 (1984). 
151. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1017 (citing Zindros, 456 A.2d at 295-96). 
152. Id. at 1017-18 (citing Zindros, 456 A.2d at 295-96). Zindros had leased the 
premises in question, which he utilized as a pizza parlor. After the fire, Zindros said he 
wished to keep the premises because he intended to repair the premises and reopen his 
business. No action was taken by the owner of the premises to terminate Zindros' 
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Therefore, although damaged by fire, the building' was still func­
tional as a storage place for Zindros' personal belongings. The dis­
sent contrasted this with the facts of Joyce, in which the fire had left 
the clothing unusableI53 and no evidence whatsoever existed that 
Joyce had expressed or exhibited an interest in the burnt 
remains.154 
The dissent further asserted that Joyce's clothing was left on 
the side of a public road, readily accessible to the public and law 
enforcement personnel, and that such abandonment "can amount 
to a loss of any justified expectation of privacy."155 Thus, the dis­
sent argued that Joyce's actions, or more specifically, his lack of 
action, resulted in the effective abandonment of his clothing and, 
accordingly, the forfeiture of his expectation of privacy in the 
clothing.156 
Justice Callahan additionally argued that Joyce did not retain a 
privacy expectation in his burnt clothing "merely because a police 
officer, rather than a passerby, happened to retrieve the remnants 
from the roadside."157 The dissent relied on State v. DeFusco,15s 
which held that whether or not an expectation of privacy is objec­
tively reasonable "cannot, logically, depend on the source of the 
intrusion on his or her privacy."159 
Finally, the dissent maintained that the fact that the clothing 
constituted incriminating evidence did not by itself create an expec­
tation of privacy in the clothing.l60 Justice Callahan relied upon 
Rakas v. Illinois,161 in which the United States Supreme Court 
lease, which was paid in full through the end of the month. Zindros testified that he felt 
he had a right to be on the premises since his rent was paid and that he intended to 
keep other people out of the building unless they had first gained his permission to 
enter. Zindros, 456 A.2d at 296. 
153. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1017-18 (citing State v. Joyce, 619 A.2d 872, 875 n.6 
(Conn. App. Ct. 1993)). 
154. Id. at 1018. The dissent pointed out that Joyce did exhibit a subjective ex­
pectation of privacy once the trial began and the results from the chemical analysis were 
to be introduced into evidence. Id. Judge Callahan contrasted this with the fact that 
Joyce's wallet was retrieved from the police by his wife the day after the fire, clearly 
exhibiting an immediate expectation of privacy in the wallet. Id. at 1018 n.l. 
155. Id. at 1018 (quoting LAFAVE, supra note 35, § 2.6 (Supp. 1994)). 
156. Id. See, e.g., Sullivan v. District Court of Hampshire, 429 N.E.2d 335, 338-39 
(Mass. 1981) (hospital employee retained no reasonable expectation of privacy in jacket 
left in public canteen area). 
157. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1018. 
158. 620 A.2d 746 (Conn. 1993). 
159. Id. at 753. 
160. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1018. 
161. 439 U.S. 128 (1978), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 1122 (1979). 
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noted that society is not prepared to recognize as reasonable a de­
fendant's subjective expectation of privacy in incriminating evi­
dence.162 Thus, even if Joyce did possess a subjective expectation of 
privacy, such an expectation is not one which society would recog­
nize as reasonable. In sum, Justice Callahan concluded that Joyce's 
privacy expectations failed the two prong Katz test,163 and that, ac­
cordingly, no warrant should have been required, the search should 
have been ruled proper, and the evidence from the chromatography 
should have been admitted. 
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
Both the majority and the dissent in Joyce agreed that in order 
to determine whether an individual possessed a legitimate expecta­
tion of privacy, the particular facts of the case must demonstrate 
that (1) the individual manifested a subjective expectation of pri­
vacy and (2) that the expectation is one which society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable.164 The justices of the Connecticut 
Supreme Court disagreed, however, when they applied the facts in 
Joyce to this rule. 
In the most general sense, the majority and dissent disagreed 
on whether the defendant possessed a protected interest in the 
burnt clothing.165 Justice Berdon asserted that the defendant did 
possess a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the 
clothing,166 while Justice Callahan claimed that he did not.167 The 
justices' opinions diverged on three distinct issues. 
First, Justices Berdon and Callahan disagreed as to whether 
fire~damaged clothing removed from a burn victim's body and left 
behind at the accident site should be categorically excluded from 
the protection of article first, section 7. In other words, is Joyce's 
burnt clothing more analogous to garbage, which can never be the 
object of a legitimate privacy expectation, regardless of the steps 
162. Id. at 143 n.12 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)). 
163. See supra note 29 and accompanying text for discussion of the two prongs of 
the Katz test. 
164. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); State v. DeFusco, 620 A.2d 
746, 750 (Conn. 1993). 
165. The majority and dissent did not disagree that the chemical analysis 
amounted to a search, and that no exception to the warrant requirement was applicable. 
These issues, therefore, are not discussed. 
166. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1016-17. 
167. Id. at 1017. 
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taken by the person in order to manifest a privacy expectation,168 or 
to a fire-damaged building, which warrants constitutional protec­
tion as long as a legitimate expectation of privacy IS 
demonstrated?169 
Second, the justices disagreed as to whether a privacy interest 
in clothing that is damaged in an arson related fire is necessarily lost 
because the clothing is used as an instrument of crime. In other 
words, is gasoline saturated clothing analogous to contraband, 
which can never itself be the object of a legitimate expectation of 
privacy due to its criminal character?170 
Finally, assuming that neither of the above categorical charac­
terizations disqualified any legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
clothing, Justices Berdon and Callahan disagreed as to whether 
Joyce nonetheless had abandoned the clothing, thereby forfeiting 
any privacy expectations he may have possessed in it.l7l 
A. 	 Whether Burned Clothing Should Be Categorically Excluded 
from the Protection of Article First, Section 7 
1. 	 Is Burnt Clothing Analogous to Garbage? 
In State v. DeFusco,l72 the Connecticut Supreme Court held 
that a defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
garbage placed at the curbside for collection.173 The court reasoned 
that when garbage is placed at the curb, it generally becomes widely 
susceptible to invasion from a variety of intruders, such as munici­
pal workers, antique collectors, bottle or coupon redeemers, 
snoops, vagrants, and animals.174 Given this common knowledge of 
168. See, e.g., DeFusco, 620 A.2d at 753 (no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
garbage placed at the curbside for pickup). 
169. See, e.g., State v. Zindros, 456 A.2d 288, 296-97 (Conn. 1983) (holding that 
the lessee of a building sufficiently demonstrated that he still possessed a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the building eleven days after it was destroyed by fire), cen. 
denied, 465 U.S. 1012 (1984). 
170. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (holding that a 
test that indicates the presence of cocaine does not violate a legitimate expectation of 
privacy); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (noting that society is not pre­
pared to recognize an expectation of privacy in incriminating evidence). 
171. See, e.g., State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 159 (Conn.) (stating that abandon­
ment of an expectation of privacy requires the relinquishment of that expectation in the 
object in question), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 (1991); State v. Philbrick, 436 A.2d 844, 
854-55 (Me. 1981) (holding that an injured defendant did not abandon his expectation 
of privacy in his knapsack when he unintentionally left it behind at the accident scene). 
172. 	 620 A.2d 746 (Conn. 1993). 
173. 	 Id. at 753. 
174. 	 Id. at 752 (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35,40 (1988) (prior to 
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the high susceptibility of such property to invasion, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court determined that individuals cannot possess a rea­
sonable expectation of privacy in their curbside garbagePS 
Although the argument was not directly addressed by the opin­
ions in Joyce, it is worth noting that Joyce's burnt clothing, left on 
the side of a public road, was susceptible to the same invasions out­
lined by the court in DeFusco. Specifically, prior to being picked 
up by the pOlice, the discarded clothing was readily available to in­
trusion by either passersby or animals. 
To argue that the clothing's susceptibility to invasion was 
enough to divest the defendant of a reasonable expectation of pri­
vacy, however, misapplies DeFusco. The language used by the 
DeFusco court states that its holding applies to "garbage placed at 
the curb for collection."176 The fact that the property was located 
at the curbside, therefore, provided notice to others that it was in­
deed garbage.!77 The DeFusco court stated, in fact, that changes in 
the location of the garbage would raise issues beyond the scope of 
its holdingPS Thus, the fact that Joyce's clothing was not placed at 
the curbside, nor any other location that, by itself, would categorize 
the property as garbage, distinguishes it from the property in 
DeFusco, the United States Supreme Court reached a nearly identical holding when 
presented with a set of facts». 
175. Id. at 753. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in contrast, has held that curb­
side garbage should receive protection against warrantless police searches. See State v. 
Hempele, 576 A.2d 793,804 (N.J. 1990) (holding that individuals may reasonably pos­
sess a different expectation of privacy with respect to police as compared to other 
intruders). 
The California Supreme Court similarly held in favor of a warrant requirement in 
People v. Krivda, 486P.2d 1262 (Cal. 1971) (en bane) (holding that an individual pos­
sesses a reasonable expectation that police officers will not rummage through their gar­
bage without a warrant), vacated, 409 U.S. 33 (1972), reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 1068 (1972), 
but its decision has been weakened by an amendment to the California Constitution 
which limits a criminal defendant's protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures to the level afforded by the federal constitution. See Gerald F. Uelmen, The 
California Constitution After Proposition /15, in 3 EMERGING ISSUES IN STATE CONSTI­
TUTIONAL LAW 33, 40 (1990). 
A minority of states have required warrants as a result of unique constitutional 
provisions. See, e.g., State v. Boland, 800 P.2d 1112, 1115 (Wash. 1990) (en bane) (hold­
ing that a warrantless search of trash violated article first, § 7 of the Washington Consti­
tution, which provides that "[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his 
home invaded, without authority of law"). Warrants have also been required due to the 
particular circumstances of the case presented. See, e.g., State v. Tanaka, 701 P.2d 1274 
(Haw. 1985) (warrant required when police trespassed across individual's property to 
seize garbage). 
176. DeFusco, 620 A.2d at 752. 
177. Id. at 748. 
178. Id. at 752. 
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DeFusco. In addition, the physical appearance of the property in 
question in DeFusco, i.e., closed plastic bags, could leave little 
doubt to a passerby that the intent was to throw it away. The ap­
pearance of the burnt clothing in Joyce, however, afforded a less 
clear indication of the owner's intentions to an observer. In other 
words, the burnt appearance did not necessarily indicate that the 
clothing was intended to be garbage. For example, an individual 
may place great sentimental value on burnt clothing as a memento 
of some significant event, such as the survival of a fire or the death 
of a loved one. To this "sentimental owner," the burnt condition of 
the clothing certainly does not render the property as garbage. 
Therefore, although susceptible to the same types of invasions, 
the distinct locations of the property in question, the dissimilar 
physical characteristics, and the uncertainty of its value to its owner 
r~moves the burnt clothing from the exception allowing the war­
rantless search and seizure of garbage. Burnt clothing may indeed 
be reduced to little more than garbage, but nonetheless it is distinct 
from the Connecticut Supreme Court's intended meaning of "gar­
bage" in DeFusco.179 




The most significant divergence between the majority and dis­
senting opinions in Joyce surrounds whether the burnt and dam­
aged condition of the clothing necessarily diminished any 
expectation of privacy that Joyce may have possessed in them. In 
other words, can an individual reasonably possess a legitimate ex­
pectation of privacy in burnt clothing? 
Justice Berdon answered this question in the affirmative, plac­
ing greater significance on the property interest in the clothing than 
on its condition,180 In other words, the Joyce majority essentially 
equated ownership of property with an expectation of privacy, sug­
gesting that Joyce's ownership of the burnt clothing was dispositive 
of the argument that its burnt condition did not diminish Joyce's 
reasonable expectation of privacy over it. This argument, however, 
is a non sequitur. Courts have held, for example, that a person who 
possesses an ownership interest in a particular piece of property 
179. See, id. at 752-53. 
180. State v. Joyce, 639 A.2d 1007, 1014 (Conn. 1994) ("Although the items of 
clothing ... were unusable as clothing and reduced to rags, they were still the defend­
ant's rags."). Id. . 
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does not necessarily possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
that same property.181 For example, individuals never possess a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in property located in open 
fields,182 regardless of the person's ownership interest in the prop­
erty. Ownership is only one of many factors to consider when eval­
uating an expectation of privacy in property. Therefore, Justice 
. Berdon's emphasis on ownership seems misplaced, and the more 
appropriate question is whether the clothing falls under a categori­
cal exception where no reasonable expectation of privacy can be 
recognized. 
In State v. Zindros, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that 
an individual maintained an expectation of privacy in a burned-out 
building.183 The Joyce majority relied on Zindros to show that fire 
damage does not diminish an individual's expectation of privacy in 
that property.l84 Such a broad application of Zindros, however, 
was heavily criticized by the Joyce dissent.18s Justice Callahan dis­
tinguished Zindros from Joyce by arguing that the damaged build­
ing in Zindros was still useful as a storage faciIity.186 Furthermore, 
Zindros manifested his expectation of privacy in the building after 
the damage occurred by continuing to lock the building each time 
it.187he left In contrast, the clothing in Joyce was rendered 
unusable188 by the fire, and Joyce did nothing to exhibit any expec­
tation of privacy in the clothing.189 
The burnt clothing in Joyce is more analogous to the burnt 
181. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 106 (1980); United States v. 
Thomas, 864 F.2d 843, 845 (D.C. Cir. 1989); State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 158 
(Conn.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 (1991). For a discussion on how property rights are 
related to Fourth Amendment rights, see Steinberg, supra note 14, at 1521-23. 
182. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (United States 
Supreme Court held that society has no interest in protecting the privacy of property 
located in an open field setting); Mooney, 588 A.2d at 152. 
183. 456 A.2d 288, 295-96 (Conn. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012 (1984). See 
supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
184. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1014-15. A related issue arose recently State v. Bernier, 
No. CR 1871493 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 22, 1995), reprinted in 2 CONN. OPS. 98 (Janu­
ary 29, 1996), in which the Connecticut State Police, without procuring a search war­
rant, used a trained dog to detect accelerants in charred floor sections of the 
defendant's fire-damaged home. The judge, relying heavily on Joyce, found that the 
State violated the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy in his living room 
floor. Id. For a discussion of how Bernier relates to Joyce, see generally Lucia J. Wol­
gast, Seize But Don't Test Withouta Warrant, 2 CONN. Ops. 89 (January 29,1996). 
185. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1017-18 (Callahan, J., dissenting). 
186. Id. at 1018. 
187. Id. See supra note 152 for a description of the facts of Zindros. 
188. State v. Joyce, 619 A.2d 872, 875 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993). 
189. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1018. 
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building in Zindros than Justice Callahan suggested. In his descrip­
tion of Joyce's clothing as "no longer usable as SUCh,"l90 Justice Cal­
lahan was probably referring to its lack of usefulness as a wearable 
garment. However, this characterization of the "use" of clothing 
may have been too narrow. For example, clothing may additionally 
be used for the temporary storage of one's personal belongings, 
such as money, keys, handkerchiefs, etc. Indeed, the defendant's 
shirt, in Joyce, albeit burnt and tom, contained a working wrist­
watch in its pocket when entered into evidence at trial.191 Thus, 
although damaged (and presumably no longer wearable), the cloth­
ing still offered a valuable use to the defendant as a personal depos­
itory. This is similar to the burnt building in Zindros, which in the 
words of Justice Callahan, "was being used as a depository for [Zin­
dros'] personal property."l92 
Of course, even clothing's potential use as storage could be lost 
if it were severely or totally burned severely.193 For example, if 
clothing is reduced to a mere pile of ashes, it would seem unreason­
able to argue that such "clothing" retained any practical use. Such 
complete destruction seems analogous to the uselessness that is fre­
quently attached to completely incinerated buildings. For example, 
in Michigan v. Clifford,l94 Justice Powell stated that as long as the 
reasonable expectations of privacy remained in a burnt building, a 
search of such a fire-damaged building required a warrant.195 Jus­
tice Powell's initial caveat suggests that this rule would not apply 
absent an expectation of privacy in the building. A building re­
duced to a pile of ashes, therefore, would not receive protection 
under Clifford; any claim of an expectation of privacy would be 
deemed unreasonable.l96 
190. [d. (Callahan, J., dissenting). Consistent with Justice Callahan's description, 
the trial court had described the clothing as "torn [and) unusable" at the motion to 
suppress hearing. Joyce, 619 A.2d at 875 n.6. 
191. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1014 n.15. 
192. [d. at 1018 (Callahan, J., dissenting). In Zindros, the defendant continued to 
store approximately $6750 worth of merchandise in the burned out building. State v. 
Zindros, 456 A.2d 288, 296 (Conn. 1983), cert. denied,465 U.S. 1012 (1984). 
193. However, as discussed previously, even severely burned clothing could retain 
some sentimental value to its owner despite its lack of "practical usefulness." 
194. 464 U.S. 287 (1984). 
195. [d. at 292-93. See also, Michigan v. lYler, 436 U.S. 499, 511-12 (1978) (re­
quiring a warrant to search burned-out house anytime after the initial entry to extin­
guish the fire). 
196. See LAFAVE, supra note 35, § 10.4 ("fires may be so devastating that no 
reasonable privacy interests remain in the ash and ruins, regardless of the owner's sub­
jective expectations"). 
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In sum, a burned-out building seems to become divested of an 
expectation of privacy when it is so badly burned that it ceases to 
exist as a building. Accordingly, it follows that clothing also be­
comes divested of an expectation of privacy when it ceases to exist 
as clothing. In his dissent in Joyce, Justice Callahan argued that the 
clothing was burned to a point of uselessness,197 but a broader view­
point of clothing's potential uses suggests that it may not have 
been.198 
B. 	 Whether an Expectation of Privacy in Clothing That Is 
Damaged in an Arson Related Fire Is Necessarily Lost 
Because the Clothing Is Used as an Instrument of 
Crime 
In the final words of his dissent, Justice Callahan stated that 
"an expectation of privacy does not attach to property merely be­
cause it may constitute incriminating evidence."l99 Although the 
Rakas v. Illinois holding was intended to apply to a defendant's 
standing,200 Justice Callahan's attempt to equate Joyce with Rakas 
raises an interesting question: Is gasoline saturated clothing analo­
gous to contraband, which can never itself be the object of a legiti­
mate expectation of privacy due to its instrumentality to a crime?201 
Although the gasoline saturated clothing in this case was simi­
lar to illegal drugs due to its value as evidence of criminal activity, 
the parallel ends there. Unlike drugs, Joyce's clothing itself was not 
the instrument of any crime. Presumably, Joyce' did not intend to 
use his clothing to facilitate an illegal act, i.e., burn the house down. 
It is much more likely that gasoline, which was used to burn the 
house, spilled onto the clothing accidently. Thus, while the gasoline 
may have been an instrument of crime, Joyce's clothing was not. 
Accordingly, Joyce's clothing was not divested of its constitutional 
protection due to any criminal instrumentality. 
Similarly, the terin "contraband" itself indicates a significant 
197. 	 See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
198. 	 See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
199. State v. Joyce, 639 A.2d 1007, 1018 (Conn. 1994) (Callahan, J., dissenting) 
(citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978» (noting that society is not pre­
pared to recognize as reasonable an expectation of privacy in incriminating evidence). 
200. 	 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12. 
201. The United States Supreme Court has determined that an individual cannot 
possess an expectation of privacy in illegal contraband itself. See, e.g., United States v. 
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (a test which indicates the presence of cocaine does 
not violate a legitimate expectation of privacy); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 
(1983) (no expectation of privacy in cocaine detected by canine sniff). 
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distinction between it and gasoline soaked clothing .. Simply pos­
sessing contraband is illegal. Possession of gasoline soaked cloth­
ing, in contrast, is not. Automobile mechanics, for instance, 
certainly spill gasoline on their clothing on occasion, but possession 
of such property in no way indicates criminal activity. Simply 
stated, gasoline is not contraband. Thus, the gasoline saturated 
clothing in Joyce is clearly distinguishable from the cocaine in 
United States v. Jacobsen 202 and United States v. Place,z03 and the 
guns in Rakas v. Illinois ,204 all of which the Supreme Court deter­
mined incapable of being the object of a legitimate expectation of 
privacy.20s Thus, even if the gasoline contained in the clothing indi­
cates criminal behavior, such an intimation does not divest the 
clothing's owner of an expectation of privacy in it. 
C. 	 Whether Joyce Forfeited His Expectation of Privacy Through 
Abandonment 
To test whether property has been abandoned, it must be de­
termined whether the owner or possessor relinquished his expecta­
tion of privacy in the property.206 Once abandonment is 
established, the law holds that no warrant is required for the police 
to search or seize the property.207 As previously discussed, the 
clothing in Joyce was not divested of Joyce's expectation of privacy 
by virtue of its location or condition. The question remains, how­
ever, whether Joyce relinquished his expectation of privacy by some 
other factual circumstance. 
First, Joyce may have relinquished his expectation of privacy 
when he allowed his clothing to be removed from his body. In Hes­
ter v. United States ,z08 the United States Supreme Court stated that 
no warrant is required for the police to seize property that is "aban­
202. 	 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123. 
203. 	 Place, 462 U.S. at 707. 
204. 	 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12. 
205. 	 See supra note 201. 
206. See State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 158-59 (Conn.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 919 
(1991). See supra part I.C.2 for detailed discussion of Mooney. 
207. See, e.g., Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960) (holding that de­
fendant's papers discovered in the wastebasket of his vacated hotel room were not pro­
tected by the Fourth Amendment). See also Steinberg, supra note 181, at 1529 ("One 
cannot manifest a reasonable expectation of privacy in an item once it has been aban­
doned."); Edward G. Mascolo, The Role of Abandonment in the Law of Search and 
Seizure: An Application of Misdirected Emphasis, 20 BUFF. L. REV. 399, 400 (1971) 
("[W]here one abandons property, he is said to bring his right of privacy therein to an 
end ...."). 
208. 	 265 U.S. 57 (1924) (Fourth Amendment did not prohibit pOlice from secur­
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doned" bya·defendant.209 Hester, however, is distinct from Joyce in 
two significant ways. First, Joyce's clothing was removed in order 
to treat an injury. Thus, the intention in removing the clothing was 
not to rid Joyce of his property, but to attend to his wounds.210 Sec­
ond, Joyce's clothing was removed by a third party,211 not by Joyce 
himself.212 Although Joyce was apparently conscious and did not 
resist the removal of his burnt clothing by paramedics,213 it seems a 
stretch to argue that he made a cognizant decision to relinquish any 
expectation of privacy he may have had in his clothing.214 In this 
way, Joyce is similar to State v. Philbrick,215 in which the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Maine held that an accident victim did not forfeit 
his reasonable expectation of privacy in his unintentionally aban­
doned knapsack. The Philbrick court reasoned that the defendant 
had not intended "to discard it or disassociate [the knapsack] from 
himself."216 In the same way, Joyce did not intend to disassociate 
his burnt clothing from himself either. Accordingly, he did not for­
feit, or abandon, his expectation of privacy in the clothing. 
An alternative argument for abandonment, raised in Justice 
Callahan's dissent, is that Joyce did not exhibit any interest in the 
burnt clothing until the laboratory results were about to be intro­
duced into evidence.217 Thus, Joyce in no way manifested a subjec­
tive expectation of privacy. It seems unfair, however, to apply this 
argument in this case, because public policy brands it unreasonable 
to require a person to affirmatively manifest an expectation of pri­
ing a bottIe after suspect dropped it), overruled on other grounds by United States v. 
Oliver, 657 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1981). 
209. Id. at 58 ("[T]here was no seizure in the sense of the law when the officers 
examined the [property] after it had been abandoned."). 
210. State v. Joyce, 619 A.2d 872, 875 n.5 (Conn. App. Q. 1993). The paramedic 
who treated Joyce explained that the burnt clothing was removed to prevent it from 
sticking to the open blisters and third degree bums and to prevent infection from the 
dirty lake water. 
211. Id. at 875. 
212. Contra Hester, 265 U.S. at 58 ("The defendant's own acts, and those of his 
associates, disclosed the [property]."). 
213. Id. 
214. The Joyce majority rejected the State's abandonment argument on grounds 
of public policy, noting that it would be unreasonable to require Joyce to express some 
expectation of privacy when his clothes were being removed from his body by 
paramedics for medical reasons or while he lay in the hospital immediately thereafter. 
State v. Joyce, 639 A.2d 1007, 1014 n.13 (Conn. 1994). 
215. 436 A.2d 844, 855 (Me. 1981). 
216. Id. 
217. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1018 (Callahan, J., dissenting). 
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vacy in his property while in a hospital recovering from injury.218 
Justice Callahan's argument becomes more plausible, however, 
in light of the fact that Joyce not only failed to manifest a privacy 
expectation while in the hospital, but also during the months fol­
lowing his release and right up until the moment of trial.219 Ulti­
mately, however, this argument must fail, for the legality of a search 
cannot depend upon what happens after the search has concluded. 
To allow this would create a standard impossible for police to fol­
low and would thus undermine the warrant requirement. The Con­
necticut Supreme Court imposes a strong preference for warrants, 
reflecting a goal of "protecting citizens from unjustified police in­
trusions by interposing a neutral decisionmaker between the police 
and the object of the proposed search."220 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant in Joyce did indeed possess a protected interest 
in the burnt clothing under article first, section 7 of the Connecticut 
Constitution. In determining whether the "owner" of burnt cloth­
ing maintained a legitimate expectation of privacy, burnt clothing is 
analogous to a burned-out building in that the severity of the dam­
age is significant in evaluating whether the owner possesses an ex­
pectation of privacy in the remains of the clothing. It is 
distinguishable from garbage in that the physical condition or loca­
tion of the burnt clothing does not necessarily divest its owner of 
any possible legitimate expectation of privacy. Thus, barring the 
total destruction of the clothing, which would make any expectation 
of privacy objectively unreasonable, or the absolute relinquishment 
of any subjective expectation of privacy by the owner, article first, 
section 7 requires the police to obtain a warrant before they can 
218. In his dissent to the appellate court decision, Judge Heiman went as far as to 
label such a requirement "Orwellian." State v. Joyce, 619 A.2d 872, 883 n.3 (Conn. 
App. Q. 1993) (Heiman, J., dissenting). 
219. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1018 (Callahan, J., dissenting). Justice Callahan bolsters 
his argument by noting that although no attempt was made to pick up the clothes from 
the police station, Joyce's wife did pick up his wallet the day after the accident. ld. at 
1018 n.l. Presumably, Justice Callahan'S argument infers that Joyce's wife's failure to 
pick up the burnt clothing while she was already at the police station retrieving her 
husband's other personal property constituted an abandonment of the clothing on 
Joyce's behalf. However, while such an abandonment argument does possess a logical 
flow, it nonetheless rests on a far broader application of third party consent than the 
United States Supreme Court has warranted. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 
164 (1974). 
220. Joyce, 639 A.2d at 1015 (quoting State v. Miller, 630 A.2d 1315, 1324 (Conn. 
1993)). 
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submit burnt clothing to chemical analysis. The damaged nature of 
the clothing does not render it unprotected. 
This rule holds true even when police legally secure burnt 
clothing in a lawful manner pursuant to their community caretaking 
function. The community caretaking function provides the police 
with only limited custodial rights and cannot be used as a substitute 
for procuring a valid warrant. Thus, when the police in Joyce trans­
ported the clothing to the forensic laboratory for chemical analysis, 
they effectively removed their caretaking hats and replaced them 
with those of criminal investigators. The Connecticut Constitution 
requires a search warrant to be procured before such investigatory 
activities may take place, and the police's failure to do so must re­
sult in the suppression of such evidence. 
Andrew S. Golden 
